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trial court's action "to attain the ends of justice." It did so, however, not
because the trial court necessarily erred in reducing the amount of support
or erred in the manner in which it did so, but rather because the entry of
a support order without any written findings as to why the guideline
amount is unjust or inappropriate and without justifying the deviation
would not provide an adequate basis for setting support in the future.
In Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America, v. Covenant Coal
Corp.,66 the unions appealed from orders which held them in contempt
for violating an injunction prohibiting certain strike-related activities.
The unions claimed that the trial court improperly imposed criminal con-
tempt fines on them in violation of their constitutional protections. The
unions, however, failed to make a contemporaneous or specific objection
in the trial court on these grounds. Nonetheless, "to attain the ends of jus-
tice" the court addressed the issue for the first time on appeal and
reversed. The appellate court found that the trial court imposed the crim-
inal fines based on a burden of proof other than guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Therefore, the court held that the unions were "denied their con-
stitutional protections, which are mandated when a party is subjected to
criminal penalties."
67
In Roane v. Roane,6 8 on appeal following a divorce action, the wife
appeared pro se, filed no brief, and alleged no error. The husband had
appealed asserting that the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that corporate stock had been transmuted to marital prop-
erty. The appellate court found error during its examination of the record.
The court discovered that the trial court had failed to respond to the wife's
request that it consider some proffered exhibits and a closer review of the
husband's assertion that no guaranty existed. Despite the wife's failure
to file a brief and assign error, the appellate court considered errors "to
attain the ends of justice" and, sua sponte, found error in the trial court's
failure to admit the proffered exhibits.
69
66 12 Va. App. 135, 402 S.E.2d 906 (1991).
67 Id. at 149, 402 S.E.2d at 914.
68 12 Va. App. 989, 407 S.E.2d 689 (1991).
69 Id. at 994, 407 S.E.2d at 701.
70 221 Va. 754, 273 S.E.2d 790 (1981).
Unlike the noncapital cases, however, where the life of a prisoner is
at stake, the Supreme Court of Virginia has overlooked procedural default
"to attain the ends of justice" only once. In Ball v. Commonwealth,
70
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the capital murder conviction of
the defendant because the defendant had been convicted of a crime of
which, under the evidence, he could not properly be found guilty. In Ball,
the defendant was convicted of murder in the commission of robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon under Virginia Code section 18.2-
31(4), which at that time allowed conviction of capital murder only for
"robbery," not "attempted robbery."7 1 The defendant had not raised this
issue at trial. The Commonwealth argued that review of the claim was
barred under Rule 5:21 (now Rule 5:25). Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court of Virginia invoked the "to attain the ends of justice" exception.
The court found that in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the evidence showed that the victim was killed during an attempted rob-
bery rather than in the actual commission of a robbery. At that time, the
most that the defendant could be convicted of was felony murder under
Virginia Code section 18.2-32.
V. CONCLUSION
Researching and attacking the bias against death sentenced prisoners
demonstrated by the Virginia courts in the application of state procedur-
al bars is an underutilized tool of appellate defense practice. Given the
growing use of other doctrines to close the doors of federal court,7 2 con-
fronting Virginia's default rules directly deserves more attention. After
all, before getting caught up in this legal game playing it is worthwhile to
ask as a matter of policy and justice whether absolute procedural order is
a value that should be elevated above protection against execution of pris-
oners whose trials have been infected by fundamental constitutional error.
71 The legislature promptly changed the statute to include "attempt-
ed" robbery.
72 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (adopting no-retroactivity principle in the context of
capital habeas proceedings).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND THE "FAILED EXPERIMENT"
BY: WILLIAM S. GEIMER
On February 22, 1994, a symbolic but important event occurred. It
merits at least passing mention as Virginia, now third among all states in
carrying out executions in modem times,1 continues to struggle with the
administration of its capital murder statutes. In a dissent from the Court's
denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins,2 Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun announced that he would no longer vote to sustain any death
sentences. The announcement is merely symbolic in the sense that Justice
Blackmun currently stands alone among court members in taking that
position. But because of who Justice Blackmun is and the unique oppor-
1 Death Row USA, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Spring 1994.
tunity which he has had to watch the modem death penalty in action, his
explanation for his change in position deserves to be read and thought-
fully considered.
This brief essay is written in the hope that it will prompt all con-
cemed with the administration of Virginia's death penalty-judges, pros-
ecutors, defense counsel, legislators-to read his opinion in its entirety.
Justice Blackmun was appointed by President Nixon. He came to
the Court with a deeply held personal antipathy for the death penalty, but
with a clear understanding of his role as one of the ultimate arbiters of the
2 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
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Constitution. He dissented in Furman v. Georgia,3 the case that struck
down the death penalty and emptied the nation's death rows in 1972.
While observing that if he were a legislator he would not support the
death penalty, Justice Blackmun concluded that the majority was improp-
erly acting as a legislature, given that capital punishment was implicit in
the very text of the Fifth Amendment, 4 and had been previously found by
the Court not to be violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Despite his vote to retain the death penalty, however, Justice Blackmun
left the door open for later developments by expressly agreeing with the
Furman majority and earlier opinions of the Court that the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment was not fixed
forever at the time the republic was founded, but is to be judged by
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society".
5
Four years later, in a series of decisions passing on the efforts of
thirty-five states to respond to the deficiencies found by the Furman
majority, the Court rejected the contention of Justices Brennan and
Marshall that standards of decency had evolved to the point of prohibit-
ing capital punishment altogether. The 1976 decisions approved the
death penalty schemes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas, 6 and rejected
those of North Carolina and Louisiana.7 The majority found the death
penalty acceptable only if state procedures could insure both that death
sentences would be rational and reviewable by providing some meaning-
ful basis for distinguishing the few cases resulting in death sentences
from the many that did not, and that sentencers be permitted to exercise
virtually unlimited discretion not to impose death after considering the
"diverse frailties of humankind." The Court expressed confidence that
the Florida, Georgia, and Texas statutes would meet those twin goals.
8
Even then, Justice Blackmun may not have shared completely the opti-
mism of his brethren. He wrote simply, "I concur in the judgment." 9
For more than twenty years afterward, Justice Blackmun was part of
the judicial enterprise attempting to oversee the administration of the
death penalty and make it work within the Constitutional limitations pre-
scribed by the Court in 1972 and 1976. Eventually, however, as a mat-
ter of Constitutional law, he determined that the requirements of consis-
tency and rationality on one hand, and the requirement of individualized
consideration on the other, simply could not be reconciled. Twenty years
of struggling to make the death penalty work finally had convinced
Justice Blackmun to step through the door he had left ajar in his Furman
dissent and conclude that the death penalty could not be administered in
a manner consistent with evolving standards of decency.
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4 "Nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law." U.S. Const. Amdmt. V.
5 Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-414 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
6 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
7 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
8 "No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence; it is always circumscribed by legislative guidelines." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,206-207 (1976).
9 Id. at 227 (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment).
10 Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1128-29 (Blackmun, J. dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
11 Id. at 1129-30. Justice Scalia wrote a churlish opinion concurring
in the denial of certiorari, using it as a vehicle to criticize Blackmun's
position. After reminding the reader of the very point that Justice
The observations of the Justice about the death penalty in action,
however, speak to much more than just this jurisprudential tension, and
they are most eloquently expressed:
We hope, of course, that the defendant whose life is at risk
will be represented by competent counsel-someone who is
inspired by the awareness that a less-than-vigorous defense
truly could have fatal consequences for the defendant. We
hope that the attorney will investigate all aspects of the case,
follow all evidentiary and procedural rules, and appear before
ajudge who is still committed to the protection of defendants'
rights-even now, as the prospect of meaningful judicial
oversight has diminished. In the same vein, we hope that the
prosecution, in urging the penalty of death, will have exer-
cised its discretion wisely, free from bias, prejudice, or polit-
ical motive, and will be humbled, rather than emboldened, by
the awesome authority conferred by the State.
10
Could anyone with knowledge seriously contend that Justice
Blackmun is describing capital litigation in the Commonwealth of
Virginia? Whether it is the degree that all court actors have fallen short of
the hope he has just expressed, or some other cause or combination of fac-
tors that prompted re-examination of his position, Justice Blackmun does
not say directly. But he concludes:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the
death penalty must be imposed fairly, with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all ... and despite the efforts of States and
Courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet
this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains fraught
with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake ....
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have endeav-
ored-indeed I have struggled-along with a majority of this
Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would
lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death
penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court's
delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved.
. I felt morally and intellectually obligated to concede that
the death penalty experiment has failed.11
Blackmun relied upon in Furman-that drafters of the Bill of Rights did
not view the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting the death penalty-
Justice Scalia simply drags out the bloody shirt and describes some ugly
crimes. This is a strange tactic for one who is criticizing an opinion for
being too "moral and personal" rather than legal. In the process, Justice
Scalia also apparently denies most of the institutional authority of the
Supreme Court to conduct judicial review and to provide definitive inter-
pretation of the Constitution. He does not like the "evolving standards of
decency" interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, so he ignores all the
Court's opinions solidly establishing that principle. He agrees that
achieving consistency, rationality, and individualized consideration in the
administration of death is impossible. He simply chides Justice
Blackmun for not doing as he does and ignoring the Court's many opin-
ions requiring that sentencers be given opportunity to decline to impose
death for reasons individual to each defendant. Justice Scalia's view of
law is simple. It is also wrong.
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Justice Blackmun is no bleeding heart. He is, however, a man of
integrity, committed to the majesty of the rule of law. For more than
twenty years, he made a good faith effort to make death work. Especially
when Virginians, even in the absence of political leadership, are seeking
non-capital alternatives, 12 Justice Blackmun's honest conclusion that the
experiment has failed deserves serious consideration by all members of
the legal profession in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Justice Blackmun announced his retirement from the Supreme Court
shortly after Callins. Perhaps his successor will learn form the wisdom of
this good man, and will conclude, sooner than later, that the experiment
truly has failed.
12 In 1989, 59% of Virginians surveyed in a study by Virginia
Commonwealth University answered "yes" to the following question:
How about a life sentence with no possibility of
parole for 25 years combined with a restitution pro-
gram that would iequire the prisoner to work for
money that would go to families of murder victims.
Would you favor abolition of the death penalty if this
were an alternative?
